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Abstract 
 
We examine seller strategies in 1177 Internet auctions on eBay, to understand the 
diversity of strategies used, and their impacts. Dimensions of strategic choice include the use of a 
‘Buy it Now’ option, the level of the starting price, and the use of a secret reserve price. A major 
focus of our analysis is on differences across sellers with different volumes of sales. The largest 
volume sellers (termed “retailers”) in our sample employ uniform selling strategies, but lower 
volume sellers exhibit a wide variety of strategic choices. While some components of sellers’ 
strategies appear important in raising seller revenue, including starting the auction with a ‘Buy it 
Now’ offer, the overall impact of seller strategy choices on the outcome appears to be quite small. 
We interpret this as evidence for the competitiveness of the online auction market for frequently 
traded items with conventional retail alternatives. An exception is provided by the use of a secret 
reserve price, which raises the winning bid conditional on a sale, but reduces the probability of a 
sale. Depending on sellers’ risk aversion and impatience, this may also be an efficient outcome.  
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 1. Introduction 
 By the end of the year 2001, eBay had become a fixture of the e-commerce sector, 
and it has continued to thrive where many other e-businesses failed. The business plan of 
eBay has constantly included actions to attract the largest number of heterogeneous 
sellers and buyers, who trade not just collectibles, but an increasingly wide variety of 
common retail products. A considerable amount of data on seller characteristics, selling 
strategies, and outcomes can be gleaned from these online transactions. As a 
consequence, auctions on eBay provide an emerging opportunity to compare selling 
strategies across individuals, small businesses, and larger retailers, something that has not 
been possible to investigate systematically prior to the advent of e-commerce. This paper 
focuses on the seller side of this market and provides insight into how the observable 
characteristics of heterogeneous sellers correlate with their selling strategies in eBay 
auctions, and with the outcomes of these auctions. We document the prevalence of a wide 
variety of seller strategies, even in the presence of a well-honed strategy used by high-
volume sellers on eBay. At the same time, the competitiveness of the market is illustrated 
by our analysis. 
 Online sales in the United States accounted for 2.8 percent of retail transactions in 
2006, or $108.7 billion out of over $3.9 trillion in total US retail sales,1 And continue to 
grow rapidly. These numbers, while still relatively small, represent substantial growth. 
While auctions have not been used for traditional, brick-and-mortar retail transactions, 
they may be better suited for online buying and selling, because of the automation of the 
                                                 
1 These estimates are from the US Census Bureau (2007): “A stratified simple random sampling method is 
used to select approximately 11,000 retail firms whose sales are then weighted and benchmarked to 
represent the complete universe of over two million retail firms… Coverage includes all retailers whether 
or not they are engaged in e-commerce. Online travel services, financial brokers and dealers, and ticket 
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 auction process and the consequent reduction in some kinds of transaction costs. In 2003, 
eBay’s net sales, from transaction fees on $15 billion in gross revenues, reached $1.2 
billion (Hof, 2003). This growth mainly involved displacing individual transactions 
conducted through traditional and less structured bargaining methods, but also some 
conventional retailing, as new and existing businesses also began to use eBay as a sales 
channel. Thus, online auctions have expanded beyond web-based garage sales or swap 
meets, focusing on collectibles or unique items, to including entrepreneurs seeking to 
launch or enhance ‘e-tail’ businesses in direct competition with traditional retail markets. 
Established retailers, such as Sears Roebuck, and other firms that have moved into 
retailing, such as Walt Disney, have responded to this threat by selling on eBay as well, 
capitalizing on their existing brand names (Hof, 2003). 
In order to achieve the objective of widespread use of its online marketplace, 
eBay has provided easily accessible tools for new and inexperienced sellers to get started, 
and to establish and maintain seller ratings, based upon buyer feedback. Although these 
tools could conceivably allow less frequent sellers to represent themselves better, and 
even mimic larger volume retailers, we find that heterogeneous seller characteristics do 
result in different seller choices, even while selling basically the same item as a retailer. 
At the same time, the openness of the online marketplace tends to even out the 
consequences of these heterogeneous seller choices. 
The variety of options available on eBay gives sellers considerable latitude in how 
they set the initial conditions for any auction and seller choices in our sample exhibited a 
wide range of strategic combinations. Examples of such choices include the length of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
sales agencies are not classified as retail and are not included in either the total retail or retail e-commerce 
sales estimates. Nonemployers are represented in the estimates through benchmarking.”  
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 auction, information provided about the product, payment options, the starting price, and 
whether to use a private reserve price. EBay auctions also allow the seller to include the 
option for buyers to purchase immediately at a pre-specified ‘Buy it Now’ price. This 
option therefore allows sellers to offer a hybrid of an auction format and a posted price 
format, as well as pure versions of each market institution.  
The side-by-side competition among sellers with widely differing degrees of 
experience in our sample, and the availability of data on selling strategies, transaction 
outcomes, and some seller characteristics on eBay, permits a new kind of analysis of 
selling strategies, particularly the possible impact of experience.2 The use of the auction 
format also permits us to compare our data with some predictions of the economic theory 
of auctions, especially what aspects of those theoretical predictions still hold in online 
auctions with multiple sellers.  
In this paper we seek to understand how sellers’ characteristics, such as reputation 
and frequency of selling, affect their choices about the initial conditions of the auction 
that are under their control. In order to examine these questions, we chose a relatively 
homogeneous, ‘mature’ product at the time of our data gathering (August-September, 
2001): the Palm Pilot Vx.  
A key result of our analysis is that price dispersion is quite low, relative to the 
degree of heterogeneity in seller strategies. We interpret this as evidence for the 
competitiveness of the eBay market place for such products, even in a relatively early 
period (2001) of the online auction institution. Thus, even though high-volume sellers 
with successful strategies do not function as ‘leaders’ in the eBay marketplace, the lack 
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 of this knowledge spillover is outweighed by the robustness of competition in online 
auctions.  
Part of the explanation for differences in strategy choices between retailers and 
lower volume sellers (and among lower volume sellers themselves) comes from observed 
differences in characteristics among sellers. We also find evidence for learning and 
experimentation among different sellers, indicating that sellers are able to adjust their 
strategy combinations in a short period of time. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the most 
relevant literature on Internet auctions, other types of Internet markets, and eBay auctions 
with the ‘Buy it Now’ option in particular. Section 3 summarizes the data, obtained from 
1177 eBay auctions for the Palm Pilot Vx, over a period of five weeks. We document the 
range of different strategic approaches, and summarize market patterns. Section 4 
examines the relationships between observable characteristics of products and sellers, and 
the relationship between sellers’ characteristics and their choices with respect to the 
format of the auction. In particular, we show that there is no monotonic relationship 
between frequency of selling and various seller strategic choices.  
Section 5 considers auctions that did not result in a sale, and discusses differences 
from successful auctions. Having a high starting price (over $100) and/or a secret reserve 
price appear to be the two main reasons for failure to sell, though this ‘failure’ would 
typically just represent a delay in selling, since an initial failure to sell allows the seller to 
re-list the item without charge. Section 6 concludes with a summary of our analysis, a 
discussion of implications, and suggestions for future research.  
                                                                                                                                                 
2 The focus on experience makes our analysis distinct from studies such as Zhuang et al. (2006), which 
examines established retailers’ strategies in the context of Porter’s overarching classification of generic 
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2. Research on Internet Auctions 
This paper attempts to understand the diversity of seller strategies for eBay 
auctions, and the effect of strategies on outcomes. Thus, the general theoretical literature 
on optimal auction design is relevant; it addresses connections between auction structure, 
efficiency, and value maximization. For instance, Riley and Samuelson (1981) evaluate 
the appropriate choice of minimum bid or reserve price for maximization of a single 
seller’s revenue, given an environment of private bidder values. The optimal minimum 
bid maximizes revenue but introduces the possibility of failure to sell the item. Auction 
design in an environment with many sellers is explored by Peters and Severinov (2006). 
The authors identify equilibrium seller behavior regarding auction structure and reserve 
prices. They verify the result of McAfee and Vincent (1993) that sellers set a reserve 
price equal to cost in equilibrium. Their primary focus, however, is on bidder response to 
such design and the resulting efficiency properties. Their environment incorporates 
neither heterogeneity in seller and product characteristics nor the potential to offer a 
posted price. In general, much of this theoretical literature does not fully capture the 
institutional features of Internet auctions. 
A key, novel feature of Internet auctions, represented in our data, is the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option. This gives bidders the option of bypassing the auction and purchasing 
immediately at a price set by the seller. Reynolds and Wooders (2004) construct a 
theoretical model of auctions with ‘Buy it Now’ offers. The model assumes all bidders 
have some risk aversion and the main results are that (1) a seller increases his revenue 
through making a ‘Buy it Now’ offer, whether it is accepted or not, and (2) bidders 
                                                                                                                                                 
strategies (low cost vs. differentiation). This is discussed further in Section 2. 
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 should have “no regret” in turning down such an offer, as long as it is not below their 
reservation value for the item and is not being used to effectively post a price by setting a 
minimum price equal to the ‘Buy it Now’ offer price. Hidvegi et al. (2006) develop a 
model of auctions where a ‘Buy it Now’ option can raise seller profit by exploiting the 
risk aversion of buyers.  An alternative motive for use of ‘Buy it Now’ pricing put forth 
by Qiu et al. (2006) suggests that sellers might use such prices as a signal to impact 
bidder valuation of items. 
The range of strategic choices available for sellers in e-commerce has attracted 
substantial interest in research into the relationship between seller choices and different e-
tail environments.  Zhuang et al. (2006) examine survey data from Business-to-Consumer 
sites to investigate this question.  They find evidence that sellers’ e-commerce strategies 
vary with seller characteristics but each of the strategies they identify allow sellers to 
enhance profits.  Unlike our paper, which examines the details of sellers’ strategy 
choices, Zhuang et al. focus on the larger consequences of overall strategic stances (i.e., 
low cost vs. differentiation) in the tradition of Michael Porter.  
More specifically, empirical studies of the conduct of online auctions address a 
wide range of issues. Pioneering work by David Lucking-Reiley (1999) focuses on 
testing classical results from auction theory, such as revenue equivalence using field 
experiments. In another field experiment, Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2000), comparing 
public and private (also called ‘secret’) reserve prices, show that the use of a secret 
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 reserve (where the seller’s reserve price is not revealed to bidders) reduces both the 
probability of a sale and the transaction price.3  
Reputation is an important aspect of e-commerce, due to the need for trust 
between buyers and sellers in a virtual environment. While an imperfect measure of seller 
trustworthiness (Malaga, 2001) and subject to manipulation by sellers (Brown and 
Morgan, 2006), reputation mechanisms such as that of eBay represent the primary source 
of information regarding sellers for potential bidders.  Resnick et al. (2003) find that the 
effects of seller reputation, often unclear in field data, are as predicted, with a positive 
impact on seller revenues when proper experimental controls are imposed. However, 
Livingston (2005) provides evidence of rapidly diminishing returns to higher reputation 
scores on eBay.  Zhang and Li (2006) consider connections between reputation measures 
and seller choices regarding payment acceptance.  They find a positive relation between 
seller reputation and wider acceptance of payment options. 
Our work belongs to the approach that collects and analyzes transactions data 
from Internet sites, rather than conducting field experiments.4 Using this method, for 
example, Morgan and Baye (2001) analyze persistent price dispersion in posted price 
markets on the Internet. Also, Houser and Wooders (2006) examine the effect of bidder 
and seller reputation on auction outcomes, concluding that seller reputations are 
correlated with auction success in Pentium III microprocessor auctions on eBay. Roth 
and Ockenfels (2002) study the timing of bids, and the impact of different methods of 
                                                 
3 One caveat to these results is that the authors found some informal evidence that sellers were using the 
secret reserve to circumvent eBay's fee structure by contacting high bidders on the side in unsuccessful 
auctions. 
4 While field experiments allow for greater control, they are limited, for cost reasons, in the kinds of goods 
they can use.  A third empirical approach has been to use laboratory experiments, e.g.,, Ariely, Ockenfels 
and Roth (2003) 
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 specifying auction deadlines.5  Lucking-Reiley et al. (2000) use data collected from eBay 
auctions of one-cent coins to study determinants of price. They find evidence that seller 
feedback ratings have a significant impact on prices, that minimum bids and secret 
reserve prices raise the auction price, and that the length of an auction has a significant 
and positive effect on price in these auctions. 
Anderson et al. (2007) examine a sub-sample of the eBay auctions considered in 
this paper, and use regression analysis to analyze auction outcomes. For example they 
find that less experienced sellers received lower prices, on average, unless they 
effectively posted a price, but seller reputation, as measured by eBay’s feedback ratings, 
did not significantly affect the final price. Milam (2002) also examines the issue of 
posted prices versus auctions, contrasting the working of eBay and Yahoo auctions in this 
respect. A major difference is that Yahoo allowed a ‘Buy it Now’ price to be available 
even after bidding starts (eBay switched to this format subsequent to our data collection 
period), and this flexibility led to the ‘Buy it Now’ option being used by a greater 
proportion of Yahoo sellers, with more auctions also ending with a buyer accepting the 
‘Buy it Now’ price. 
 
3. Data Overview 
 Seller behavior on an online auction site is best examined with a reasonably large 
sample of auctions involving a homogeneous good, and over a short period of time. 
Therefore we chose to gather data for a homogeneous item with a high sales volume 
during our sample period (August-September 2001): the Palm Vx handheld computer. 
                                                 
5 See also Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) and Ockenfels and Roth (2006) on this and related issues. 
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 The data was taken from eBay, the largest Internet auction site, using a web-crawling 
‘spider’ program, similar to that described in Lucking-Reiley et al (2000). 
 
EBay Auction Rules 
Before presenting the data, we review eBay’s basic rules during our sample 
period. The seller provides information on the item, such as a description and picture, 
terms of payment and shipping, and chooses the duration of the auction, either 3, 5, 7, or 
10 days. The seller also chooses a minimum first bid, or starting price, and whether to 
enter a secret reserve price. Potential buyers know when a secret reserve price exists but 
do not know its value until someone bids above it. Sellers may also provide links to their 
own “home pages” on the web, which can be a source of further information for buyers. 
Potential buyers can bid on any item they find on eBay’s web site and current, but 
abbreviated, bid histories are available to them. That is, a potential buyer can observe the 
history of bid increments since the beginning of the auction but they cannot observe how 
high the current, winning bidder is willing to bid (maximum bid) or other, exact bid 
amounts in the bid history. The auction ends at the pre-specified time (i.e., a “hard” close 
to the auction – see Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth, 2003), and the item goes to the highest 
bidder for the minimum bid increment above the second highest bidder. This represents a 
fairly standard second-price auction. Details of shipping and payment are left up to the 
buyer and seller, although eBay provides services for these aspects of the transaction, for 
an additional fee. Finally, eBay also provides a record of comments about buyers and 
sellers, so that sellers have the potential to develop and maintain reputations. Potential 
buyers have access to these comments, as well as all seller-provided information.  
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 The seller also can specify a ‘Buy it Now’ price, whereby s/he commits to sell the 
item immediately to any buyer who accepts that specified price, thus ending the auction 
early. The ‘Buy it Now’ option is extinguished (and disappears from the item’s auction 
site) when any buyer enters a bid that is at least as great as the minimum first bid, even if 
the first bid is lower than the ‘Buy it Now’ price.6 The seller can prevent this from 
happening by specifying a starting price (or a secret reserve price) at or above the ‘Buy it 
Now’ price. Such price combinations are equivalent to the seller having a posted price 
(by far the dominant method of pricing in developed countries prior to the use of Internet 
auctions), since bidding is rendered irrelevant. A scan of buyer comments on eBay 
suggested that they found the practice of using a high secret reserve price annoying and 
might avoid such auctions. Using a high starting price is just as effective and more 
transparent. Used by itself, the ‘Buy it Now’ option creates a hybrid institution, a mix of 
an auction and a posted price. 
 
The Data 
We collected complete data on 1177 Palm Vx auctions on eBay from August 6 to 
September 11, 2001.7 The Palm Vx was available at that time, new, in many different 
types of conventional, “bricks-and-mortar”, retail outlets and was also available, used, in 
                                                 
6 As noted in the last section, this feature has now changed, to allow the ‘Buy it Now’ offer to persist. 
7 Data gathering was interrupted by the events of ‘9-11;’ however, we believe we have sufficient data to 
make our main point of robust competition. Subsequent revisiting of eBay’s auction sites, to buy and sell 
many different items, and ‘checking-in’ on the evolution of eBay’s institutions, including ‘Buy it Now’, has 
led us to remain confident in still being able to use this dataset in order to understand eBay seller behavior. 
Options regarding the “Buy it Now” feature have expanded to allow sellers to offer items under the “Buy it 
Now” price exclusively, equivalent to the posted price practice we observed using a first bid equal to buy 
price.  Other changes since our sample period have chiefly been improvements in access technology that 
have increased the frequency with which bidders can bid, and the turnover and numbers of infrequent 
sellers.  Even in 2006, the consistency of strategies amongst retailers using eBay to sell an increasing 
variety of goods and the heterogeneity of strategies of less-frequent sellers appear to remain as we have 
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 traditional resale outlets, such as pawn shops, during our sample period. Of all the 
auctions in our sample, 1008 resulted in a sale, while 169 were unsuccessful. Section 4 
focuses more (though not exclusively) on these 1008 successful auctions. Section 5 
provides an analysis of the differences between auctions that resulted in a sale and those 
that did not, and examines all of the 1177 auctions.  
A list of all the variables used in the analysis is provided in Table A of the 
Appendix. The observable product characteristics are coded as 0-1 variables, with our 
categorization of the characteristic being present relying on a definitive indication in the 
accompanying product description. Most important to our analysis is the frequency with 
which the seller’s auctions appear and the feedback rating of the seller. We categorize the 
number of auctions conducted by an individual during the sample period as follows:  
SINGLSLR codes 1 auction, MULTSLR codes 2-10 auctions, FREQSLR codes 11-50, 
and RETAILER codes over 50. Seller ratings, measuring reputation, are derived from a 
simple accounting of the string of unique positive and negative comments, accrued by the 
eBay member through his/her past behavior as either a buyer or as a seller. We use two 
alternative measures: NEGRATIO is the ratio of negative to total comments and 
LNSLRTNG is the natural log of the difference between the number of positive and 
negative comments. Thus lower NEGRATIO and higher LNSLRTNG indicate two 
aspects of better seller reputation. 
The two rating variables are not highly negatively correlated (Table 3), suggesting 
they capture different aspects of reputation. Even if old, possibly irrelevant, negative 
comments on a seller do matter to a potential buyer, one should expect them to eventually 
                                                                                                                                                 
identified them in this paper. This is not surprising, given that we argue that the robustness of competition 
with online auction institutions allows them to support heterogeneous seller strategies. 
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 be swamped by mostly positive feedback if the seller continues to be able to sell on eBay. 
That is, for an experienced eBay seller/buyer mistakes of the past are not likely to be 
reflected in the rating, nor easily discovered by the potential buyer, although the negative 
feedback remains on the seller’s permanent record. Due to this limited variation in 
number of negative comments amongst sellers and small number of negative comments, 
NEGRATIO may be a superior reputation measure. 
The focus in this paper is on seller characteristics and strategies. In general, the 
observed characteristics of the good were not strongly correlated with seller 
characteristics, choices, or auction outcomes. The correlations are all reported in Table B 
of the Appendix. Some correlations are noteworthy. For example, ‘frequent’ sellers were 
more likely to put a new item up for sale. Other correlations, such as the relatively strong 
positive correlation between DAMAGE and NEGRATIO when ‘Buy it Now’ was 
accepted, are unsurprising.  
Table 1 presents the mean values of the variables for the 1008 successful auctions, 
where these means represent proportions for the 0-1 variables. The first column reports 
on the full sample of completed transactions, the second and third report the subsamples 
for which the seller did not or did use the ‘Buy it Now’ option, and the last two divide the 
previous subsample according to whether the ‘Buy it Now’ option was exercised. For 
example, row one of the table indicates that the ‘Buy it Now’ option is less likely to be 
offered, but more likely to be accepted, on new items, which constitute 28.3% of the 
entire sample.8 The QUANTITY variable refers to the number of units offered in a 
                                                 
8 The proportion of new items could be understated, since items that were not factory “sealed” in the 
original box may not have been explicitly described as “new.” In particular, the two retailers in the sample 
did not sell “new” items according to this classification. The ‘spider’ program used had to focus on certain 
key words and qualifiers in the title and text describing the item. Since the sellers are likely to shade the 
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 particular auction; the modal value is always one, since single item sales are by far the 
most common9 DAYS806 is the time trend; auctions starting later would tend to yield 
lower prices due to economic obsolescence. We also use the DAYS806 variable to track 
experimentation by sellers who sold multiple times during our sample period. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Turning to seller characteristics, it is noteworthy that the two retailers in our 
sample accounted for more than half of the ‘Buy it Now’ offers but only 1% of ‘Buy it 
Now’ transactions. Seller ratings are better on average in the ‘Buy it Now’ subsamples. 
Seller choices are summarized in the next section of the table: starting prices, the use of a 
secret reserve, whether or not to make a ‘Buy it Now offer, and whether or not to use that 
‘Buy it Now’ offer to effectively post a price are the ones that matter most in the 
following analysis. Starting prices average about $60, but diverge for accepted and not 
accepted  ‘Buy it Now,’ reflecting the fact that this option was accepted almost 
exclusively when it was a posted price (POSTDPRC = 1). Secret reserve prices were used 
in 18.3% of all auctions, and more frequently when a ‘Buy it Now’ price was accepted. 
47.1% of auctions in our sample offer the ‘Buy it Now’ option; of these 19.2% actually 
are posted price.10
                                                                                                                                                 
truth as much in their favor as possible, our specifications for the script search had to be very strict. Similar 
issues arose with the presence of “extras.” 
9 Only two sellers (not retailers per our classification) sold significantly large quantities per auction. In 
looking at seller choices, their strategies were basically the same, though quite different from the retailers. 
They did not use a secret reserve price but they did set their starting prices very high. Such auctions are 
termed “Dutch Auctions” on eBay and usually result in the seller receiving a lower price in order to move a 
larger quantity of items more quickly. We define “retailers” to exclude such sellers, whose choices might 
consistently be affected by extraordinary time constraints. 
10 The low number of sellers posting a price in our sample may indicate that sellers interested in posting a 
price preferred to use alternative posted price sites, such as Half.com, rather than working within the eBay 
framework, where most buyers expect to find auctions. We also noted by inspection that eBay allowed 
sellers to post links to their storefronts at Half.com in order to sell the same item at a posted price.  
 13
 The last part of the table contains data on the auction outcomes, including average 
duration, the number of bids, number of unique bidders, and the winning bid. Part of the 
attraction of offering the ‘Buy it Now’ option, for sellers who wish to increase the pace of 
sales, is apparent from the decrease in average duration from 5 days, for auctions without 
the ‘Buy it Now’ option to about 2 days, when ‘Buy it Now’ was accepted.  
 
Market Patterns 
To understand the market conditions underlying the means in Table 1, we also 
examined statistics on the actual number of sellers and key seller choices on a typical 
day, including sellers who were unsuccessful that day. On average, about 29 unique 
sellers were selling the item on any given day and they held about 34 auctions in 
attempting to sell about 58 individual items per day. About 29 of the 34 auctions per day 
resulted in a sale, and about 3 of these ended with acceptance of a posted price offer, on 
average. Each day during our sample period, at least 1 auction received no bids, and a 
maximum number of 5 auctions received no bids on some days. Including unsuccessful 
auctions (omitted in Table 1), there was an average of about 9 unique bidders per auction 
and they averaged about 16 bids per auction (including no bids on some auctions). These 
statistics describe a very competitive market for the sellers during our sample period. 
The data includes a large number of apparently inexperienced sellers with 
heterogeneous characteristics, as one would expect. These sellers tried a wide range of 
strategies. They did not follow the strategies of retailers, even when they had similar high 
seller ratings. Interestingly, out of 441 unique sellers, only 63 decided to post a price, but 
they were all successful at selling at that price. Posted prices were very close to the 
prevailing “market” price for the item. Since the ‘Buy it Now’ price remained visible for 
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 the entire duration of the auction only if it was somehow protected on eBay, and posting 
a price in this way appears to have been less annoying to buyers than holding a secret 
reserve price, this seems to have been an attractive strategic option. Since very few sellers 
felt confident enough to post a price on eBay, it may not be straightforward for new 
sellers to identify and copy successful auction strategies, in particular those of 
experienced, high-volume retailers.  
The data suggest that buyers and sellers in the auctions are generally well aware 
of outside alternatives, including other auctions for the same product: this is a relatively 
“thick” market with good information. 11 For example, the 62 sellers who posted prices 
chose very similar price levels. Interestingly, 69 sellers in this sample made ‘Buy it Now’ 
offers that were about $25 higher than the “equilibrium” price. It is possible that this 
strategy was intended to catch any highly risk-averse or impatient buyer, who would be 
willing to pay such a premium. In practice, this never happened in the sample period. 
Also surprising was the fact that the majority of sellers did not make a ‘Buy it Now’ 
offer, even though it was costless to do so.12 A possible explanation may be lack of 
experience. From Table 1, sellers who offered the ‘Buy it Now’ option earned about an 
extra $6 per transaction, on average, but differences in characteristics of the good or 
auction (e.g. multiple units) seem to explain the difference.  
Additional insight into the data comes from identifying individual sellers through 
the unique email addresses they provided to eBay. Sellers could have used different email 
aliases, but our sample period was short enough that this should have been rare. We then 
                                                 
11 Borle et al. (2006) document the prevalence of multiple bidding across auctions that are running 
simultaneously. This practice is certainly present in our sample, and contributes to the competitiveness of 
the market. 
12 There is no evidence that offering a ‘Buy it Now’ price annoys buyers, as can happen with secret reserve 
prices. EBay has since instituted a nominal charge of $0.05 – 0.25 for use of ‘Buy It Now.’ 
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 tracked the timing of the day they started each of their auctions as well as changes in 
strategies of the more frequent sellers. These changes can be interpreted as 
experimentation by sellers. 
During our entire sample period, 441 unique sellers sold the item at least 1 time, 
and 86 individuals attempted (unsuccessfully) to sell the item.  
• Of the 441 sellers, 132 sold after making a ‘Buy it Now’ offer and 63 of these 
sellers used this offer in tandem with an equivalent starting price to effectively 
post a price. 
• Of the 132 ‘Buy it Now’ sellers, 11 sold with both posted price offers and with 
“regular” ‘Buy it Now’ offers; of these, 6 made their first sale with a posted price 
and then followed that with their first regular ‘Buy it Now’ sale. The other 5 sold 
with a regular ‘Buy it Now’ offer before successfully using a posted price offer. 
Nine ‘Buy it Now’ sellers also successfully tried non-‘Buy it Now’ auctions, with 
5 selling first with a non-‘Buy it Now’ auction and 4 selling following the 
opposite sequence. 
• 18 of the 132 ‘Buy it Now’ sellers also had auctions that resulted in “no sale”. Of 
these, 10 failed to sell for the first time before being successful with a ‘Buy it 
Now’ auction, and the other 8 had already successfully made a sale in an auction 
with a ‘Buy it Now’ offer before their first unsuccessful auction (during our 
sample period). 
To provide an example of experimentation during our sample period, our lower 
volume retailer (100 auctions during the period) successfully experimented on the 17th 
day of the period with a posted price of $209 and ended up raising the ‘Buy it Now’ 
offers on her subsequent auctions to $209 (after all of her previous auctions in our sample 
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 had been started with a ‘Buy it Now’ offer of $199). Although no ‘Buy it Now’ offer by 
this seller, outside of the lone posted price offer, was accepted either before or after this 
experiment, the seller did not again post a price during our snapshot. For the two retailers, 
the final sales prices appear to have been high enough, on average, to repeatedly adopt 
the same strategy, which included making a high, unprotected ‘Buy it Now’ offer, in 
order to sell multiple items every day.  
 
4. Seller Characteristics and Choices in Successful Auctions 
Table 1 indicated that seller ratings were better on average for the sellers that 
made ‘Buy it Now’ offers, and final sale prices were higher in such cases, even when the 
‘Buy it Now’ option was not used. Reputation has been one of the important seller 
characteristics to be analyzed in research on Internet auctions. The issue is how to judge 
the quality of the seller in the absence of familiar visual signals (storefront, location, and 
so on). As noted in hedonic studies of seller rating, surveyed by Bajari and Hortascu 
(2004), feedback may underrepresent buyer satisfaction due to reluctance to leave 
negative comments for fear of retaliation. Our alternative measures of reputation are 
designed to overcome this shortcoming, which may affect eBay’s own rating measure. 
Correlations between seller characteristics, seller choices, and outcomes are 
reported in Table 2. One might expect selling frequency and rating to be positively 
correlated. An exception to this in our sample is the existence of sellers who repeatedly 
sell very “well used” or damaged goods on eBay, and have a large number of negative 
comments. This fact surfaces in the positive correlations between the ratio of negative 
comments and being a ‘multiple’ seller (with 2-10 auctions in our sample) for both ‘Buy 
 17
 it Now’ sub-samples. This higher proportion of negative feedback may be a function of 
product heterogeneity associated with used goods. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In the relationship between seller reputations and seller choices regarding auction 
conduct, causality is difficult to establish. However, the observed correlations of the 
starting bid variables and use of secret reserve are consistent with the conjecture that 
greater flexibility in accepting bids compensates for deficient seller characteristics, and 
may be preferred by potential bidders. This is reflected in the positive correlations of 
NEGRATIO with starting price, use of a secret reserve and auction duration. These 
correlations are strongest for the auctions that started with a ‘Buy it Now’ offer. The ratio 
of negative comments is not strongly correlated with most of the other seller choices. 
Sellers who started their auctions with ‘Buy it Now’ and have a higher ratio of 
negative feedback, tend to set lower ‘Buy it Now’ prices (Table 2). This likely reflects 
the negative impact of negative comments on price in general, as seen in the negative 
correlations with WINBID. In fact, auction outcomes, duration, number of bids, number 
of bidders, and the final price are all negatively correlated (in this subsample) with 
negative feedback on these sellers.13  
 
Selling Frequencies and Strategies 
We next examine how the choice of starting an auction with a ‘Buy it Now’ offer, 
other seller choices regarding conduct of the auctions, and outcomes vary across selling 
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 frequency groups. Figures 1-6 chart mean values of auction characteristics in our sample, 
according to the different selling frequencies, in order to better identify patterns in 
auction strategy across seller types. Figure 1 demonstrates how, on average, a seller’s net 
rating (LNSLRTNG) increases with increased frequency of selling. Thus, more frequent 
selling of Palm Pilot Vx’s during our sample may be indicative of more experience with 
eBay overall. In interpreting the selling strategies of less frequent sellers we might 
envision them as more in a process of experimentation, although we were best able to 
track experimentation for only the more frequent sellers during our snapshot.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
However, results for the alternative rating measure are somewhat different. Figure 
2 illustrates the differences in NEGRATIO across seller categories. Note that for the 
sellers in our retailer category this proportion is very small. The remaining types show an 
increasing proportion of negatives with selling frequency during the sample period.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 3 presents average seller choices involving whether to protect price, either 
through a posted price or a secret reserve price, and whether to start the auction with a 
‘Buy it Now’ offer. Starting the auction with ‘Buy it Now’ may signal impatience, or that 
the seller has some idea of what the equilibrium price should be. Alternatively, it can be a 
strategy to capture impatient buyers. It might, therefore be more prevalent amongst more 
frequent sellers. However, the mean proportion of auctions that start with ‘Buy it Now’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 One detail about our sample period that should be noted here is that seller ratings were updated once 
during our sample period, at the beginning of September, and no seller’s rating appeared to decrease at that 
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 varies little, and unsystematically for all the groups excluding retailers. The averages in 
Table 1 suggested that making a ‘Buy it Now’ offer might leave a positive impression on 
bidders, even after it was erased by the first bid. However, sellers other than the retailers 
were inclined to forgo any potential signaling effects of a ‘Buy it Now’ offer, in favor of 
more direct strategies to attempt to boost the sales price of the item, such as posting a 
price, requiring bidders to match a secret reserve or starting the auction at a higher initial 
price. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Protecting a price with either a secret reserve price or by posting a price is not a 
favored strategy by either retailer, but the proportion of these choices is also not 
monotonically decreasing with increased selling frequency for our less-frequent sellers. 
Therefore, these choices do not appear to be predictably tied to the volume of sales by 
sellers. Of course, these choices are often combined in different ways by the different 
sellers. Single sellers were the most likely to protect their price with a secret reserve 
price. Posting of fixed prices using a ‘Buy it Now’ price in conjunction with an equal 
starting price or secret reserve was most popular with the ‘multiple’ and ‘frequent’ 
categories of sellers. 
The last method of protecting a price is to simply set a higher starting price, with 
a tradeoff between attracting fewer bidders and bids vs. forcing bids to higher levels 
earlier in the bidding process. Average starting prices and corresponding sales prices are 
depicted in Figure 4. On average, by group, single sellers started with slightly lower 
                                                                                                                                                 
time. 
 20
 prices than multiple sellers but frequent sellers favored even lower starting prices, but no 
group was anywhere near the starting price of $0.01 used by the retailers.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
One can see from Figure 4 that retailers did sell their products for higher average 
prices, although they started the auctions without posting a price, no secret reserve, and 
the lowest possible starting price. The frequent sellers in our sample held as many as 20-
33 auctions during our sample, yet still did not consistently adopt the same strategies as 
our retailers or do as well in the end, on average. Multiple sellers held as many as 10 
auctions during our sample period yet their final sales prices were the worst of all, on 
average. There is a big jump in the number of auctions held by retailers versus other 
categories, and inventories, as well as other unobserved characteristics, are likely to differ 
substantially between retailers and all of the other seller categories. Still, it is noteworthy 
that even multiple sellers appeared to still be experimenting with their sales strategies 
during the sample period.  
The consequences of seller choices on the conduct of their auctions are shown in 
Figure 5. Briefly, single sellers attracted the lowest number of bids and unique bidders 
even though their auctions lasted the longest period of time. We must therefore look to 
seller characteristics, rather than seller choices, to explain how this group of sellers 
managed to do better on average than ‘multiple’ sellers (Figure 4). 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Multiple sellers appear to have attracted only slightly more bids and bidders than 
single sellers, while frequent sellers were substantially better, as a group, at encouraging 
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 more excitement surrounding their auctions. Retailers did not attract that many more 
unique bidders than frequent sellers but the bidding appears to have been allowed to carry 
on for a bit longer, which may help explain the slightly higher sales prices that the two 
retailers received, on average, relative to frequent sellers. 
We also checked for how the mean quality of the product varied across these 
groups of sellers. It is apparent from the Figure 6 that selling more frequently meant 
dealing less and less with damaged merchandise. It also meant offering fewer extras as 
part of the product package. It should be noted that sales of new items on eBay appear 
more prevalent with greater selling frequency of the seller. Note that the two retailers 
were selling new but repackaged items, probably returned items from some other retail 
outlets. However, these items were not classified as “new” using our criteria. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
To test statistical significance across different levels of sellers, we first conducted 
t-tests of differences in means across seller frequencies for several conduct and outcome 
variables. These results are presented in Table 3, and confirm that the differences in 
strategies and reputations across pairs of seller frequencies identified visually above were 
typically statistically significant. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 A further test of differences across seller frequencies was performed with one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The null hypothesis in this case is that there is 
jointly no significant difference across categories. We tested this with and without 
retailers in the set of seller categories. The results are presented in Table 4, where F-
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 statistics and significance levels are given. It is clear that, with the exception of the 
decision to use the ‘Buy it Now’ option for the case where retailers are excluded, the null 
of no difference in mean choices across seller categories is rejected in every case. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 Further insight into the differences across seller frequencies is obtained through 
two-way ANOVA.14 Table 5 presents results for an analysis of factors affecting the 
choice of whether a secret reserve is used or not. For this analysis, seller ratings are 
simplified to a binary variable (above average or not). While the use of a low starting 
price has no significant impact, seller ratings do matter for the use of a secret reserve 
price. In particular, for the sample excluding retailers, the difference across frequency 
categories is no longer significant, except as an interaction effect with the rating variable. 
In other words, the impact of rating on the choice of a secret reserve price differs across 
selling frequencies. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 The results in Table 5 are complemented by a two-way ANOVA of factors 
affecting the choice of a starting price, now considered as the actual starting price, rather 
than a high-low variable. These results are presented in Table 6. In this case, differences 
across seller groups are always significant, while the seller rating has a significant impact 
only through its interaction with the frequency of selling. An important feature of Table 6 
is in the comparison of all auctions with successful auctions. In particular, the impact of 
the choice of a secret reserve price on the choice of the starting price is no longer 
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 significant when only successful auctions are considered. This is related to a point we 
develop in the next section, that a key driver of differences in the sample auctions was the 
use of a secret reserve price. 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
5. Sale Probabilities, Seller Characteristics and Strategies  
In this section, we analyze the impact of the use of a secret reserve price on the 
probability of successful completion of an auction. Table 7 illustrates systematic 
differences between auctions that resulted in a sale and those that did not. In particular, 
potential sellers who used a secret reserve price were much more likely to fail to sell the 
item. Furthermore, a higher proportion of the auctions that did end in a sale started with 
the ‘Buy it Now’ option. Sellers in our sample rarely chose to use ‘Buy it Now’ to 
effectively post a price, but all posted prices resulted in a sale.  
[Table 7 about here] 
 
As reported in section 3, we were able to track individual sellers, and insights into 
selling strategies and success can be gained from that information. There were 124 
unique potential sellers who failed to sell in at least one auction during the sample period. 
Of these, 70 required the bidders to meet a secret reserve price to win the auction. 51 of 
the unsuccessful sellers made ‘Buy it Now’ offers, and these offers averaged about $240. 
For auctions that ended in a sale, the average seller rating was higher for unsuccessful 
sellers that offered ‘Buy it Now’ compared to those that did not. 39 of these 124 potential 
sellers who failed to sell in at least one auction were successful in selling at least one item 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 We are indebted to a referee for suggesting this analysis. 
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 in a different auction. Many components of these sellers’ strategies were altered between 
successful and unsuccessful auctions for these sellers, but one that went largely 
unchanged was the choice of whether or not to set a secret reserve price. 16 sellers failed 
to sell with a secret reserve price, and at least one switched to holding no secret reserve 
price after failing to sell. At least one other switched to holding a secret reserve price 
after successfully selling without one and subsequently failed to sell the second item 
during our sample period. Observation of the eventual sales prices for these 16 sellers 
indicates that they typically lowered their secret reserve price in order to sell the item.  
The most common strategic error of the other 23 (i.e., 39 – 16) eventual sellers in 
their unsuccessful auctions was to set a starting price that was too high, receiving no bids 
as a result. Unlike secret reserve auctions, we could directly observe that most of these 
sellers lowered their starting prices, and that this usually led to final bids lower than their 
previous starting prices. To manage this possibility, 13 of these unsuccessful 23 sellers 
proceeded to make posted price offers, which were accepted. In some cases, potential 
sellers received no bids even with a low starting price, because there were so many sellers 
of the item. In one extreme example, a seller failed to sell in an auction that started on the 
9th day of our sample period, with a starting price of $1, no secret reserve, and a ‘Buy it 
Now’ offer of $149. This seller was successful with this same strategy in 5 other auctions 
that started on the same day, and the average sales price in those auctions was about 
$175. After gaining this experience, this same seller relisted the unsold item on the 14th 
day of our sample period for a posted price of $200, and it sold for that amount. 
To summarize, the main reasons for failure to sell were having a secret reserve 
price, a high starting price, or both. About 85 sellers never did succeed during our 
snapshot, and 9 of these 85 failed to sell in multiple auctions. Of these 9, 5 failed to sell 
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 twice, and 4 failed to sell thrice each. All of these 9 consistently required potential 
bidders to meet a secret reserve price. Our sample period was too short to observe if more 
of these potential sellers would eventually succeed in selling the item. 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 elucidates the impact of choosing a secret reserve price. The proportion 
(likelihood) of auctions without a secret reserve price that resulted in “no sale” was only 
74/898 = 0.082. By comparison, the proportion of secret reserve auctions that resulted in 
“no sale” was 95/279 = 0.341. However, this does not imply that using the secret reserve 
was futile. Successful secret reserve auctions in this sample resulted in higher prices, 
ceteris paribus, consistent with the findings of Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2000). Within 
our sample of successful auctions (1008 observations), the mean sales price for all sellers 
who held a secret reserve price was $207.20 while that for the sellers who did not hold a 
secret reserve was only $199.22. A t-test comparing these two average sales prices 
indicated that the difference between them was significant at the 1% level. Also, sellers 
had the option of relisting and selling with a different strategy, so the true cost of the 
secret reserve was delay rather failure in selling. Thus, the cost of the average $8 gain in 
the sale price would have been significantly less than the difference in probabilities of 
sale for individual auctions (0.918 vs. 0.659). 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
In Table 9, we consider differences between strategies and seller characteristics 
for auctions that resulted in a sale or not, broken down by frequency of selling. There are 
some variations across the non-retailer categories, but the main difference is between 
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 these sellers and retailers. This view of the data highlights the distinctiveness of the 
retailer strategy.  The unanimous application of the ‘Buy it Now’ option with a low 
starting price, but not as a posted price in the vast majority of cases stands in contrast to 
the variety seen on the strategies of others.  The negative influence of secret reserve 
prices on probability of a sale can be seen here.  This probably explains the observed 
avoidance of such reserve prices on the part of retailers.  
Finally, we carried out a two-way ANOVA with respect to the outcomes of 
whether the auction concluded with a sale, and the winning bid in successful auctions. 
These results are reported in Table 10. Overall, the results are consistent with earlier 
conclusions that selling frequency does matter: here, for outcomes rather than for seller 
choices. However, the key result in Table 10 is with respect to successful auctions, once 
the retailers were excluded. In this case, once the use of a secret reserve price is 
accounted for, selling frequency has no significant explanatory power. This indicates that 
this strategic dimension was the main determinant of differences across frequency 
groups, in terms of the level of the winning bid. In other words, the observed 
heterogeneity of strategies did not significantly affect this key outcome, consistent with 
the market being highly competitive. 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
A major conclusion of our analysis is that the common eBay selling strategy of 
the retailers in the sample did not serve as a template which less frequent sellers of the 
same product followed. This difference in strategy was not explained by any one 
observed characteristic of the sellers themselves, including their eBay reputations, nor 
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 was it only due to differences in product characteristics. The pattern of strategy choices 
was a combination of observable characteristics and different levels of experience 
amongst the sellers in the sample.  Some sellers were clearly still in a process of 
experimentation with the various components of their selling strategies.  
Despite the variation in strategies, the competitiveness of the online market came 
through in the fact that there was much greater dispersion in seller choices than in the 
mean final sales price, especially conditional on selling frequency. This can be tied in to 
observations with respect to differences between less frequent sellers and retailers: only 
the latter would have an incentive to fine tune their selling strategies, while less frequent 
sellers would make do with slightly lower returns, in exchange for avoiding learning 
costs.  
A priori, we expected negative comments in a seller’s ratings to have a 
detrimental effect on a seller’s eBay reputation and, therefore, on the seller’s choices and 
the outcomes of these auctions. However, in Table 2 we observed that the ratio of 
negative comments was not highly correlated with either sellers’ choices or the 
conduct/outcomes of their auctions. It is possible that negative comments are not easily 
observed by buyers, being effectively buried on a separate seller’s feedback page, which 
allowed sellers to avoid any significant negative effect on reputation. The retailers in our 
sample were clearly in a different reputational category 
If some auctions include the ‘Buy it Now’ option, and others involve straight 
auctions, then in a separating equilibrium, more risk averse and/or impatient buyers will 
go for the ‘Buy it Now’ price (Reynolds and Wooders, 2004). However, the market for 
our homogeneous item was sufficiently thick that the ‘Buy it Now’ option, when used, 
was mostly not availed of by buyers. Nevertheless, the winning bid in auctions where 
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 ‘Buy it Now’ was offered was slightly higher, which may be due to product quality 
differences, multiple items being sold, or a signaling effect of the ‘Buy it Now’ offer, 
rather than impatience or risk aversion. 
The features of the specific strategy adopted by the retailers are also of interest, 
namely, that (i) seller ratings are higher for retailers than for the rest of the sample, which 
relates to our discussion of how eBay’s seller ratings favor more frequent sellers; (ii) both 
of the retailers in our sample started their auctions by making a ‘Buy it Now’ option 
available but they did not post a price (except for in one experimental auction) by setting 
the starting price to equal the ‘Buy it Now’ price; (iii) retailers did not rely on a secret 
reserve price to protect their ‘Buy it Now’ price and the starting prices that they selected 
were all the lowest possible ($0.01), to encourage a larger volume of bidding. Thus, all 
retailers in our sample took full advantage of the hybrid, ‘Buy it Now’ institution by 
using it to provide a quick sale to impatient buyers, yet encouraging as much bidding up 
of the price as possible, if no impatient buyer happened to be shopping at the time. This 
retailer strategy illustrates the appeal of ‘Buy it Now’ for larger volume sellers on eBay.  
Many lower volume sellers were experimenting with different selling strategies 
during our entire sample period and some held multiple unsuccessful auctions. Future 
work may be able to explore the possibility that information technology accelerates 
processes of evolution of strategies in markets. On the other hand, high turnover and 
heterogeneity among sellers on eBay will continue to make convergence of strategies 
difficult. In a broader perspective, one can view eBay and other online auctions as a type 
of ‘lab’ for studying the evolution of markets, where both larger corporations and 
individual entrepreneurs may be represented. 
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 Finally, our analysis of unsuccessful auctions clearly illustrated the importance of 
a secret reserve price, leading to a trade-off between selling price and probability of sale. 
Our analysis is limited to a single item, and single time period. Hence, there is scope for 
significant further analysis with additional data sets. Future work that is more concerned 
with the dynamics surrounding experimentation and re-entry can build upon our 
observations here, and attempt to follow sellers who failed to sell, in order to determine 
how their strategies evolve in future attempts. 
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Table 1: Sample and Sub-sample Means 
 
Variable All Sales 
 “Buy it Now” 
not Offered 
“Buy it Now” 
Offered 
“Buy it Now” 
not Accepted 
“Buy it Now” 
Accepted 
Product Characteristics 
NEW 0.283 0.368 0.187 0.157 0.312 
DAMAGE 0.019 0.023 0.015 0.005 0.054 
EXTRAS 0.316 0.400 0.223 0.168 0.452 
QUANTITY 1.793 2.480 1.021 1.026 1 
DAYS806 18 18 17 17 18 
Seller Characteristics 
SINGLSLR 0.316 0.445 0.173 0.131 0.344 
MULTSLR 0.216 0.270 0.156 0.089 0.430 
FREQSLR 0.208 0.285 0.122 0.099 0.215 
RETAILER 0.259 0 0.549 0.681 0.011 
NEGRATIO 0.019 0.030 0.007 0.005 0.017 
LNSLRTNG 4.132 3.313 5.052 5.155 4.627 
Seller Choices 
SLRHOME 0.210 0.141 0.288 0.309 0.204 
STARTPRC $62.56 $63.91 $61.05 $26.20 $204.20 
LOWSTPRC 0.541 0.435 0.659 0.819 0 
PRIVTRES 0.183 0.225 0.135 0.086 0.333 
FEATURED 0.020 0.038 0 0 0 
DSCLNGTH 9618 4485 15378 18126 4090 
IMAGE 0.794 0.675 0.926 0.953 0.817 
SCRPYDUM 0.800 0.705 0.905 0.937 0.774 
POSTDPRC 0.090  0.192 0.003 0.968 
STRTBYNW 0.471  1 1 1 
BYNOWPRC $224.34  $224.34 $229.03 $205.08 
Auction Outcomes 
DURATION 5.030 5.164 4.880 5.516 2.269 
ENDBYNOW 0.101  0.196 0 1 
NUMBIDS 17.299 18.317 16.156 19.500 2.419 
UNIQBIDR 9.771 10.424 9.038 10.804 1.785 
WINBID $200.83 $197.94 $204.07 $204.04 $204.20 
Sample Size 1008 533 475 382 93 
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 Table 2: Correlations of Seller Choices and Auction Outcomes with Seller 
Reputational Characteristics 
 
 
 All Sales 
No  
“Buy it Now” 
Only  
“Buy it Now” 
“Buy it Now” 
not Accepted 
“Buy it Now” 
Accepted 
Variable NEGS. RTNG NEGS. RTNG NEGS. RTNG NEGS. RTNG NEGS. RTNG
Seller Choices           
SLRHOME -0.03 0.45 -0.00 0.40 0.09 0.48 0.03 0.59 0.32 0.13 
STARTPRC 0.06 -0.17 0.00 -0.09 0.24 -0.29 0.26 -0.38 -0.36 0.06 
LOWSTPRC -0.27 0.32 -0.24 0.17 -0.33 0.38 -0.34 0.46 0 0 
POSTDPRC -0.01 0.08   0.26 -0.16 0.09 -0.01 0.06 -0.09 
STRTBYNW -0.24 0.46         
BYNOWPRC     -0.34 -0.19 -0.24 -0.37 -0.37 0.05 
PRIVTRES 0.02 -0.27 -0.03 -0.19 0.09 -0.34 0.16 -0.41 -0.12 -0.16 
FEATURED -0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DSCLNGTH -0.05 0.57 0.38 0.31 -0.22 0.65 -0.21 0.78 0.03 0.21 
IMAGE 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.35 -0.06 0.30 -0.14 0.30 0.11 0.25 
SCRPYDUM -0.01 0.29 0.08 0.19 -0.10 0.25 -0.20 0.21 0.122 0.25 
Auction Outcomes           
ENDBYNOW -0.02 0.08   0.25 -0.15     
DURATION -0.18 -0.08 -0.27 0.00 -0.18 -0.14 -0.08 -0.34 -0.11 0.12 
NUMBIDS -0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.15 -0.26 0.20 -0.20 0.15 -0.04 0.10 
UNIQBIDR -0.04 0.12 -0.02 0.17 -0.32 0.21 -0.30 0.18 -0.06 0.11 
WINBID -0.07 -0.04 -0.00 -0.08 -0.23 -0.12 -0.14 -0.22 -0.36 0.06 
Sample Size 1008 533 475 382 93 
 
 
Table 3: T-tests for Differences in Means across Seller Frequencies 
 
 
Variable 
Single vs. 
Multiple 
Single vs. 
Frequent  
Single vs. 
Retailer 
Multiple vs. 
Frequent 
Multiple vs. 
Retailer 
Frequent vs. 
Retailer 
Seller Reputation       
NEGRATIO -2.397* -6.379* 5.121* -4.035* 6.585* 9.929* 
LNSLRTNG -4.427* -11.292* -23.778* -5.679* -15.017* -9.872* 
Seller Choices       
STARTPRC -1.454 4.397* 19.567* 5.220* 16.869* 11.012* 
POSTDPRC -2.904* -22.072* -7.517* -16.165* -4.134* 11.204* 
STRTBYNW -2.038* -0.485 -30.317* 1.418 -20.549* -23.404* 
PRIVTRES 4.028* 2.520* 12.138* -1.287 6.660* 7.656* 
Auction Outcomes       
DURATION 4.255* 7.423* 0.472 2.389* -3.359* -5.968* 
NUMBIDS -0.667 -4.387* -12.014* -2.599* -5.771* -3.054* 
UNIQBIDR -1.408 -5.678* -15.352* -2.938* -4.873* -1.169 
WINBID 2.371* -1.261 -1.753 -3.926* -4.070* -0.908 
 
Note: * denotes significance at 5% level  
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Table 4: One-Way ANOVA 
Variable 
Including 
Retailers 
Excluding 
Retailers 
Seller Reputation   
NEGRATIO 41.668*** 25.181*** 
LNSLRTNG 160.846*** 55.359*** 
Seller Choices   
STARTPRC 105.428*** 15.042*** 
POSTDPRC 18.009*** 6.426*** 
STRTBYNW 219.128*** 2.230 
PRIVTRES 36.378*** 8.257*** 
Auction Outcomes   
DURATION 18.290*** 25.492*** 
NUMBIDS 25.805*** 8.734*** 
UNIQBIDR 26.614*** 15.108*** 
WINBID 6.966*** 6.310*** 
 
Note: *** denoted significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 5: Two-Way ANOVA – Choice of Secret Reserve 
 All Auctions Sales Only 
 Incl. Retailers No Retailers Incl. Retailers No Retailers
Factor (1177 obs.) (912 obs.) (1008 obs.) (747 obs.) 
LOWSTPRC1 0.01 0.27 0.15 2.16 
Frequency Group2 5.26*** 5.22*** 7.93*** 8.18*** 
LOWSTPRC*Frequency 0.64 0.74 0.71 0.78 
 R2 = 0.1020 R2 = 0.0128 R2 = 0.1021 R2 = 0.0261 
HIRATING3 20.03*** 17.32*** 16.95*** 12.46*** 
Frequency Group 13.76*** 0.74 12.70*** 3.70** 
HIRATING*Frequency N/A 4.93*** N/A 6.27*** 
 R2 = 0.1151 R2 = 0.0378 R2 = 0.1130 R2 = 0.0540 
 
Notes: (1) LOWSTPRC = 1 if the initial bid price is set by the seller to be ≤ $20; = 0, Otherwise. 
(2) Frequency Groups are defined as Single Sellers, Multiple Sellers, Frequent Sellers, and 
Retailers. 
(3) HIRATING = 1 if the eBay seller rating is above the median for the entire sample (N = 1177); 
= 0, Otherwise. 
Significant at the 1% level = ***, at the 5% level = **, and at the 10% level = *. 
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Table 6: Two-Way ANOVA – Choice of Starting Price 
 
 
 All Auctions Sales Only 
 Incl. Retailers No Retailers Incl. Retailers No Retailers
Factor (1177 obs.) (912 obs.) (1008 obs.) (747 obs.) 
PrivtRes 20.48*** 13.63*** 0.69 0.00 
Frequency Group2 118.22*** 13.99*** 100.69*** 15.04*** 
PrivtRes*Frequency N/A 0.13 N/A 3.61** 
 R2 = 0.2331 R2 = 0.0530 R2 = 0.2401 R2 = 0.0488 
HIRATING3 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.11 
Frequency Group 72.08*** 14.22*** 70.98*** 13.08*** 
HIRATING*Frequency N/A 9.59*** N/A 9.82*** 
 R2 = 0.2197 R2 = 0.0561 R2 = 0.2397 R2 = 0.0639 
 
Notes: (1) The outcome variable for this ANOVA (“Starting Price”) is not equal to the factor variable 
LOWSTPRC, rather it is the initial starting bid price, as chosen by sellers at the beginning of 
each auction.   
(2) Frequency Groups are defined as Single Sellers, Multiple Sellers, Frequent Sellers, and 
Retailers. 
(3) HIRATING = 1 if the eBay seller rating is above the median for the entire sample (N = 1177); 
= 0, Otherwise. 
Significant at the 1% level = ***, at the 5% level = **, and at the 10% level = *. 
 
 
Table 7: Differences between Auctions that Resulted in a Sale or Not 
 
Selected Seller Choices and Characteristics Sale No Sale 
Seller had a Secret Reserve Price 0.183 0.562 
Seller Chose to Make a ‘Buy it Now’ Option Available 0.471 0.302 
Seller Chose to use “Buy it Now” to Effectively Post a Price 0.090 0 
Seller only Held 1 Auction During the Sample period 0.316 0.396 
Seller Held 2-10 Auctions During the Sample Period 0.216 0.450 
Seller Held 10-50 Auctions During the Sample Period 0.208 0.130 
Seller Held over 50 Auctions During the Sample Period 0.259 0.024 
Number of Unique Negative Comments on Seller 2.77 2.04 
Number of Unique Positive Comments on Seller 230 116 
Seller Rating 228 115 
Sample Size 1008 169 
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Table 8: Numbers of Auctions Resulting in a Sale with Use of Secret Reserve 
 
No Secret Reserve Secret Reserve Total 
Auction Resulted in No Sale 74 95 169 
Auction Resulted in Sale 824 184 1008 
Total 898 279 1177 
 
 
Table 9: Differences between Auctions that Resulted in a Sale or Not, by Seller Type 
 
 Single Sellers Multiple Sellers Frequent Sellers Retailers 
Selected Seller Choices and 
Characteristics Sale No Sale Sale No Sale Sale No Sale Sale No Sale
Seller had a Secret Reserve Price 0.317 0.567 0.170 0.592 0.219 0.545 0 0 
Sellers' Choice of a Starting Price 
(Mean) 89.534 119.746 100.220 92.841 59.249 65.564 0.811 0.010 
Seller Chose to Make a ‘Buy it Now’ 
Option Available 0.257 0.179 0.339 0.368 0.276 0.318 1 1 
Seller Chose to use “Buy it Now” to 
Effectively Post a Price 0.097 0 0.188 0 0.090 0 0.004 0 
Number of Unique Negative 
Comments on Seller 1.022 0.179 1.959 1.382 8.767 10.318 0.743 0 
Number of Unique Positive 
Comments on Seller 112.40 25.79 155.82 105.58 264.30 424.41 409.38 146.00 
Seller Rating 112 26 154 104 257 417 409 146 
Sample Size 319 67 218 76 210 22 261 4 
 
 
 38
 Table 10: Two-Way ANOVA – Auction Outcomes 
 
 
 
 Proportion of Sales Mean Level of Winning Bid 
 Incl. Retailers No Retailers Incl. Retailers No Retailers
Factor (1177 obs.) (912 obs.) (1008 obs.) (747 obs.) 
LOWSTPRC1 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.13 
Frequency Group2 9.90*** 11.47*** 4.33*** 6.02*** 
LOWSTPRC*Frequency 0.32 0.38 1.13 1.60 
 R2 = 0.0641 R2 = 0.0269 R2 = 0.0238 R2 = 0.0210 
PrivtRes 95.21*** 74.66*** 9.40*** 8.64*** 
Frequency Group 16.09*** 20.39*** 8.19*** 1.98 
PrivtRes*Frequency N/A 9.64*** N/A 0.49 
 R2 = 0.1336 R2 = 0.1201 R2 = 0.0295 R2 = 0.0296 
HIRATING3 1.68 1.24 4.20** 3.94** 
Frequency Group 17.02*** 11.81*** 8.39*** 6.24*** 
HIRATING*Frequency N/A 5.03*** N/A 0.22 
 R2 = 0.0646 R2 = 0.0381 R2 = 0.0245 R2 = 0.0225 
LOWSTPRC 0.22 0.55 0.08 0.08 
PrivtRes 134.97*** 90.14*** 4.74** 6.77*** 
LOWSTPRC*PrivtRes 29.20*** 17.99*** 5.60** 2.78* 
 R2 = 0.1261 R2 = 0.0946 R2 = 0.0172 R2 = 0.0182 
 
Notes: (1) LOWSTPRC = 1 if the initial bid price is set by the seller to be ≤ $20; = 0, Otherwise. 
(2) Frequency Groups are defined as Single Sellers, Multiple Sellers, Frequent Sellers, and 
Retailers. 
(3) HIRATING = 1 if the eBay seller rating is above the median for the entire sample (N = 1177); 
= 0, Otherwise. 
Significant at the 1% level = ***, at the 5% level = **, and at the 10% level = *. 
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Figure 1: Mean Seller Rating for Each Group of Sellers in Sample 
(Sellers Grouped According to Sample Selling Frequency) 
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Figure 2: Fraction of Unique Negative Comments 
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 Figure 3: Selected Seller Choices 
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Figure 4: Mean Starting Prices and Winning Bids by Seller Group 
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 Figure 5: Mean Auction Conduct Indicators, Conditional on Seller Group 
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Figure 6: Mean Proportion of Auctions for Product with each Characteristic 
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 Appendix 
Table A: Variable Names and Definitions 
 
Variable Description 
NEW 
Equal to one, if the item is definitively described to be “sealed, in the box, and new” in either the title of the 
auction listing or in the description text (zero otherwise) 
DAMAGE Equal to one, if any significant damage to the item is mentioned in either the title or the description text. 
EXTRAS 
Equal to one, if the item is being offered with significant accessories, mentioned in either the title or the 
description text. 
QUANTITY Number of items sold in a single, particular auction. 
DAYS806 Number of days between the start of the auction and the date of the first auction in the sample (8/6/01). 
SINGLSR Equal to one, if the seller only held one auction during our sample. 
MULTSLR Equal to one, if the seller held more than one auction but no more than ten auctions during our sample. 
FREQSLR Equal to one, if the seller held more than ten auctions but no more than fifty auctions during our sample. 
RETAILER Equal to one, if the seller held more than fifty auctions during our sample. 
LNSLRTNG 
Natural logarithm of the difference between the number of unique, positive comments about the seller and the 
number of unique, negative comments. 
NEGRATIO 
Ratio of the number of unique, negative comments to the total number of unique comments listed in the 
seller's feedback page. 
SLRHOME Equal to one, if the seller posts a link to his website in the description text of the auction listing. 
STARTPRC Initial price to start the bidding, posted by the seller at the beginning of the auction. 
SQRSTPRC Square of the seller’s starting price. 
LOWSTPRC  Equal to one, if the seller posts an initial price below twenty dollars. 
POSTDPRC Equal to one, if the seller sets the initial price equal to a displayed, ‘Buy it Now’ price. 
STRTBYNW 
Equal to one, if the seller offers buyers the option to buy the item immediately at a displayed, ‘Buy it Now’ 
price. 
BYNOWPRC Seller's price if displayed at the beginning of the auction as a ‘Buy it Now’ offer. 
PRIVTRES 
Equal to one, if the seller displays a notice that actual sale is subject to a buyer at least bidding as high as some 
unknown, secret, reserve price. 
FEATURED 
Equal to one, if the seller paid extra to have the item(s) listed at the top of the listings, no matter what the 
potential buyer's search criteria was. 
DSCLNGTH 
Number of text characters in the description of the item, composed by the seller for the auction listing page, 
minus the number of HTML tags. 
IMAGE Equal to one, if the seller included at least one image in the description of the item. 
SCRPYDUM Equal to one, if the seller accepts credit cards, PayPal, or eBay Online Payments. 
DURATION Duration of the auction, initially set by the seller to a maximum of 3, 5, 7, or 10 days. 
ENDBYNOW Equal to one, if the auction ends with a buyer accepting a seller's ‘Buy it Now’ option. 
NUMBIDS Number of bids on the item(s) in a particular auction. 
UNIQBIDR Number of unique bidders for the item(s) in a particular auction. 
WINBID Dollar value of the final bid in an auction that resulted in a sale. 
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 Table B: Correlations Between Product and Seller Characteristics 
 
Non–‘Buy it Now’ Sub-sample (533 Observations) 
Variable NEW DAMG. EXTS. QUNT. DAYS. SINGL. MULT. FREQ. RET. NEGS. LRTNG
NEW 1 -0.06 -0.23 -0.02 0.02 -0.29 -0.02 0.34 0 0.27 0.08 
DAMAGE  1 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 0 -0.06 0.04 
EXTRAS   1 -0.12 0.02 0.36 0.04 -0.43 0 -0.21 -0.14 
QUANTITY    1 0.09 -0.23 -0.01 0.27 0 0.01 0.27 
DAYS806     1 0.01 0.08 -0.09 0 0.04 -0.06 
SINGLSLR      1 -0.54 -0.57 0 -0.22 -0.33 
MULTSLR       1 -0.38 0 -0.06 0.04 
FREQSLR        1 0 0.31 0.32 
RETAILER         1 0 0 
NEGRATIO          1 0.04 
LNSLRTNG           1 
            
“Buy it Now” not Accepted Sub-sample (382 Observations) 
Variable NEW DAMG. EXTS. QUNT. DAYS. SINGL. MULT. FREQ. RET. NEGS. LRTNG
NEW 1 -0.03 0.27 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.27 0.55 -0.63 0.17 -0.23 
DAMAGE  1 0.16 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.15 
EXTRAS   1 -0.05 0.01 0.41 0.18 0.39 -0.65 0.22 -0.41 
QUANTITY    1 -0.04 -0.04 0.32 -0.03 -0.15 0.12 -0.10 
DAYS806     1 0.01 -0.05 0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 
SINGLSLR      1 -0.12 -0.13 -0.57 0.14 -0.36 
MULTSLR       1 -0.10 -0.46 0.40 -0.35 
FREQSLR        1 -0.49 0.07 -0.14 
RETAILER         1 -0.38 0.56 
NEGRATIO          1 -0.20 
LNSLRTNG           1 
            
“Buy it Now”–Accepted Sub-sample (93 Observations) 
Variable NEW DAMG. EXTS. QUNT. DAYS. SINGL. MULT. FREQ. RET. NEGS. LRTNG 
NEW 1 -0.16 -0.10 0 0.02 -0.19 -0.30 0.61 -0.07 -0.02 0.37 
DAMAGE  1 -0.12 0 0.12 0.03 0.08 -0.12 -0.02 0.45 -0.12 
EXTRAS   1 0 -0.06 0.02 -0.18 0.21 -0.09 -0.19 -0.10 
QUANTITY    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DAYS806     1 -0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 
SINGLSLR      1 -0.63 -0.38 -0.08 -0.20 -0.42 
MULTSLR       1 -0.45 -0.09 0.19 -0.11 
FREQSLR        1 -0.05 0.02 0.59 
RETAILER         1 -0.05 0.12 
NEGRATIO          1 -0.15 
LNSLRTNG           1 
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